



The Mutual Dependency of Force and Law in 
American Foreign Policy 
Richard A. Epstein† & Mario Loyola†† 
A successful American grand strategy requires a close integration of interna-
tional and domestic institutions and practices. This Essay explores the vital inter-
dependence of grand strategy and law, both international and domestic. First, it 
asks how the United States should formulate its foreign policy strategy by pointing 
to the three primary components that must be deployed in tandem to forge a suc-
cessful American foreign policy—persuasion, inducements, and force. Second, this 
Essay shows that in light of the distribution of powers between the president and 
Congress, and within the executive branch, the execution of that strategy requires a 
high level of bipartisan consensus in favor of an approach that neither disclaims 
the use of American power nor solely relies on it. The soundness of this strategy is 
tested against the American experience in Iraq and elsewhere. 
INTRODUCTION 
The continuing failure of US policy in the Middle East has 
brought to the fore a major dysfunction at the heart of American 
foreign policymaking, which brings with it grave implications for 
the stability of the international system. This dysfunction has 
manifested as a series of interrelated problems in strategy, do-
mestic politics, and international law. In a sound foreign policy, 
like that of the United States during the Cold War, the elements 
of strategy, domestic politics, and international law work in 
harmony. When they conflict, as they have since the end of the 
Cold War, the result is disintegration of both US policy and the 
international system as a whole, which then results in ever-
heightening risks for peace and security. 
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This Essay examines two key questions. First, the question of 
the country’s external role: How should the United States interact 
with the rest of the world in terms of both strategy and interna-
tional law, and should it act as a world leader or as just one na-
tion among equals? Second, the question of internal governance: 
How should the United States distribute powers internally 
among its various branches of government to fulfill its proper 
role in the international arena? 
These two questions are interrelated. As demonstrated by 
America’s successful Cold War strategy and the Pax Americana 
that it nurtured in the free world, an effective grand strategy 
rests on persuasion, inducements to key players, and a credible 
threat of force.1 Public persuasion—both domestic and interna-
tional—is needed to create a broad base of support. But you 
cannot win over 100 percent of the relevant players by persua-
sion alone. Persuasion can be effectively deployed only if the 
proper inducements, whether financial or military, are supplied 
to key players over time. Like all self-enforcing contracts, waver-
ing parties will cooperate only if the gains that they hope to re-
ceive from future cooperation exceed the gains that they hope to 
receive from defection.2 Persuasion and inducements must in 
turn be backed by a credible threat of force against those nations 
and groups that threaten us or our allies. Without a concerted ef-
fort along all three fronts, American power fragments, and policy 
will fall into the familiar trap of making commitments that far 
exceed its available resources, a situation that Walter Lippmann 
described as a “bankrupt foreign position.”3 A grand strategy 
based on the proper mix of persuasion, inducements, and credible 
threats of force can be effective only over periods of time that ex-
ceed those of any single presidential administration. They there-
fore must be enshrined in domestic and foreign institutions. 
That is the deeper significance of alliance treaties: they are 
valuable because they consecrate the marriage of persuasion, 
 
 1 See Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American 
Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush 17–58 (Cornell 2014) (analyzing el-
ements of US policy during the Truman administration, a period “often thought of as the 
golden age of American grand strategy”). 
 2 See Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agree-
ments and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis L Rev 551, 558–63 (comparing enforcement 
difficulties faced by nation-states entering into international agreements to enforcement 
difficulties faced by private contracting parties); Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Coopera-
tion under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 World Polit 1, 4–11 (1985) (examining 
payoff structures that favor international cooperation). 
 3 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic 43 (Little, Brown 1943). 
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inducements, and credible threats of force for the purposes of 
both international and domestic law.4 In short, grand strategy 
depends on international law to be effective. The reverse is also 
true: principles of international law cannot survive unless sup-
ported by sound domestic institutions and policies, particularly 
of a stable constitutional order. A proper, coherent grand strate-
gy, duly developed within a stable democracy, should define in-
ternational law, and it should do so in ways that render the 
strategy effective. 
The relation of grand strategy, domestic politics, and inter-
national law described above corresponds to the old order that 
relied on American exceptionalism to maintain the international 
system during the Cold War. The defense of this position is not 
without difficulties. One central premise of formal international 
law is the parity and equal dignity of sovereigns in their rela-
tions with each other.5 But in our view, that parity leads to a 
huge power vacuum that can be filled only if someone—
preferably the United States—takes on extra responsibilities 
and exercises additional leadership. This Essay is a defense of 
that old order and an exhortation to revive and preserve its es-
sential elements, including, when necessary, the use of preemp-
tive force. Of course, the old order was not without major 
flaws—but as we will show, those flaws generally confirm the 
insights developed in this Essay. 
In Part I, we examine in detail the three key components to 
the successful American foreign policy mentioned above—
persuasion, inducements, and force—and discuss why they de-
pend on, and must define, international law. In Part II, we look 
at the law of the use of force under the UN system, its implicit 
modification by the formation of NATO, and its points of conflict 
with the basic elements of a successful foreign policy. In Part III, 
we look at the elements of the American Constitution that or-
ganize the division of control over foreign policy to show how 
these elements create an institutional arrangement that allows 
for the formation of a foreign policy that is effective, proactive, 
and legitimate. 
 
 4 See Andrew G. Long, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kyeonghi Baek, Allying for Peace: 
Treaty Obligations and Conflict between Allies, 69 J Polit 1103, 1105–07 (2007).  
 5 See, for example, Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sover-
eign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the 
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
done within its own territory.”). 
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I.  THE THREE PILLARS OF GRAND STRATEGY 
Looking globally, the restoration of American influence 
abroad requires a three-part strategy: persuasion, inducement, 
and force.  
 The first part of this strategy, persuasion, is to engage in 
public debate and general discussion to win over a broad base of 
popular support in other countries. That task is never easy, and 
it requires a deep understanding of local norms and culture to 
succeed. Unless the United States can mobilize a broad base of 
popular support, it cannot sustain the policies that are needed to 
protect itself and to maintain peace and security in those regions 
of the world that are crucial for its vital interests. In principle, 
this should be the least controversial of the pillars because it in-
volves neither the promise of explicit benefits nor the carrying out 
of explicit threats. In working this strategy, care must be taken 
not to seek a monopoly over the outlets for speech lest we create 
deep resentments among the very people we want to persuade. 
The second prong of the grand strategy is intended to pick 
up where general persuasion leaves off. It requires the United 
States to offer direct, material support to specific political 
groups and, more generally, to make financial and security 
commitments to induce other nations to cooperate with it in in-
ternational affairs. In essence, the United States cannot expect 
to demand any case-by-case quid pro quo whereby for each ad-
vantage that it confers on its allies and trading partners, it re-
ceives something of a like kind in exchange. Rather, what the 
United States wants from its trading partners is their durable 
support and cooperation, in a setting in which immediate tangi-
ble benefits are but one part of a far larger picture. 
To understand how inducement fits into the overall scheme, 
it is useful to refer to the late Professor Gary Becker’s “‘rotten 
kid’ theorem,” articulated in his article A Theory of Social Inter-
actions.6 Becker’s theorem assumes, in its simplest form, a fami-
ly of three, in which the head of the family, well-endowed with 
resources, takes into account the welfare of two children, each of 
whom is by assumption totally indifferent to the welfare of the 
other.7 The theorem postulates that by withholding or granting 
benefits to the two children, the parent can make them act “as if 
 
 6 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J Polit Econ 1063, 1076–83 (1974). 
 7 Id at 1076–78. 
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they love[ ]” one another, even if they do not.8 The hard question 
therefore is how to identify the particular settings in which the 
rotten-kid theorem is likely to hold. 
Within the family context, Becker’s view is unduly pessimis-
tic because, biologically speaking, it wrongly presupposes that 
there are no bonds of affection between the children that make 
them want to cooperate even in the absence of their parents. The 
theorem holds strong in the international arena, however. Con-
sider the Sunni-Shiite conflict throughout the Middle East and 
particularly in Iraq, where indifference is displaced by active 
enmity.9 The only way to make both sides cooperate is by mak-
ing bribes that are sufficiently large to prevent each faction from 
targeting members of the other group. Killing or arresting any 
one person does not end the conflict, as it would in Becker’s nu-
clear family. It only spurs a further cycle of revenge and suicide 
killings. The superpower pays those inducements willingly be-
cause the conflict between the two sides, including its repercus-
sions on third parties, is more costly than the bribes.  
Events in Iraq between 2007 and 2011 illustrate this point. 
Like the head of a family, a world power has to broker deals be-
tween parties who might otherwise kill each other—a function 
the United States performed reasonably well between the 2007 
surge and the end of the Iraq War in 2008, when General David 
Petraeus paid Sunni tribes to stand with the United States 
against al Qaeda.10 Matters started to deteriorate between 2009 
and the withdrawal of US forces in 2011.11 The decision of the 
Obama administration to condition future US support on the 
prior willingness of local factions to cooperate betrays a deep 
confusion of cause and effect, for as we saw in the early years of 
the Obama presidency, the local factions will cooperate, for the 
moment, only if they can be sure of US support.12 As with all 
 
 8 Id at 1080. 
 9 See, for example, Zoe Mintz, How the Sunni-Shiite Conflict Frames the Current 
Crisis in Iraq (International Business Times, June 17, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9LJS-CXWU. 
 10 See Reuel Marc Gerecht, Hope and Change in Iraq (The Weekly Standard, Mar 22, 
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/8M97-D5QX (“But in Iraqi Shiite eyes what Washington 
has been doing since the surge began in 2007—when General David Petraeus started 
paying Sunni tribes to stand against al Qaeda and with the Americans—is bribing the 
Sunnis to behave.”). 
 11 See Pete Hegseth, Iraq’s Disintegration (National Review, June 21, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/H72B-ZD9D. 
 12 See Dexter Filkins, What We Left Behind (New Yorker, Apr 28, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/VV5F-5C8Q (“When the last American soldiers left Iraq, at the end of 
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contractual arrangements, matters of sequential performance 
are critical, and some transactions will not take place unless 
someone can underwrite the risks for the parties involved.13 
The third pillar of foreign policy is coercion backed by the 
credible threat of force against those who are not brought into 
line by the first two strategies. This approach will surely fail if 
the first two steps have not succeeded at reducing the arena in 
which force should be exercised. But even if they are successful, 
they will ultimately be made credible only if we are prepared to 
use force, both alone and with our allies, to defend our friends 
and to attack our enemies. It was a careful combination of these 
three elements that accounted for the success of the surge under 
the command of Petraeus.14 It should go without saying that the 
ability to implement this three-part strategy overseas requires a 
coherent and stable foreign policy consensus at home. 
The case for coercion follows from the social contract theo-
ries of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and John Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Government. The great challenge of this pillar is to 
eliminate the physical and emotional insecurities that arise 
from the unbridled use of force in human affairs. Hobbes ce-
mented his position in the pantheon of political theory by noting 
that in the state of nature, “the life of man, [is] solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish, and short.”15 In the state of nature, all evident 
differences in strength do not matter.16 The strongest has to 
sleep, at which point the weakest, or a confederation of the 
weakest, can slay him with impunity.17 The rough equality 
among men necessarily means that no one person gains any se-
curity by going it alone.18 But what happens when people band 
together for voluntary protection? No doubt these alliances will 
help, but their promise is unfulfilled so long as even one person 
(let alone one nation) is prepared to operate with force outside 
 
2011, the bloody civil war between the country’s Sunni and Shiite sects had been stifled but 
not resolved. Now the sectarian violence had returned, with terrifying intensity.”). 
 13 For an illustration of the importance of risk underwriters for the sequential per-
formance of contracts, see Wisconsin Knife Works v National Metal Crafters, 781 F2d 
1280, 1285 (7th Cir 1986). 
 14 For Petraeus’s account of how a “comprehensive strategy” worked, see David 
Petraeus, How We Won in Iraq (Foreign Policy, Oct 29, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/N75T-ULK8. His prophecy has surely proved correct. 
 15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 89 (Cambridge 1991) (Richard Tuck, ed) (originally 
published 1651). 
 16 See id at 86–87. 
 17 See id at 87. 
 18 See id at 87–88. 
  
2016] The Mutual Dependency of Force and Law 95 
 
the common framework that has been accepted by everyone else. 
That one person can pose a mortal threat to all others. Making a 
bargain with that one person may ease the short-term worry, 
but it will not cure the problem. That initial bribe will tempt at 
least one other person to adopt that hostile strategy and pick up 
where the original assailant left off. A succession of purchases 
can bankrupt the virtuous, but it cannot win the peace. Only 
force can combat force. 
Couched in somewhat more modern terminology, there is a 
huge transaction cost obstacle facing any group of virtuous indi-
viduals that are trying to buy their way out of threats from the 
few. This somber conclusion does not depend on the relentless 
Hobbesian assumption that every person is driven by greed and 
self-interest.19 Quite the opposite: so long as some tiny fraction of 
the population has that tendency, peace and social stability will 
quickly fall apart even if everyone else wants to cooperate to se-
cure them. 
Only counterforce against the intransigent outsider can se-
cure social peace. If the majority can succeed in squelching the 
initial threat, the next person will hesitate before he takes the 
same aggressive posture. The initial victory allows the dominant 
group to consolidate its position and thus be better positioned to 
deal with subsequent threats. That victory ends the cycle of sur-
render and allows the game to come to successful closure. 
Or does it? As Hobbes well understood, using force to combat 
force has all the dangers of playing with fire, for a dominant 
power can also use its power to suppress its legitimate adver-
saries and not only to defend its citizens.20 Still, Hobbes put his 
faith in the single, dominant sovereign.21 But as Locke pointed 
out, that consolidation of power creates a great risk to citizens’ 
lives, safety, and property if their sovereign turns evil.22 It is a 
 
 19 See Hobbes, Leviathan at 105 (cited in note 15) (“For no man giveth, but with 
intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the 
Object is to every man his own Good.”). 
 20 See id at 148 (giving examples of rulers using sovereign authority to execute in-
nocent subjects). 
 21 Id at 120: 
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them 
from . . . the injuries of one another . . . is, to conferre all their power and 
strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all 
their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will. 
 22 For a discussion of the danger of consolidated, absolute power and an implicit cri-
tique of Hobbes’s sovereign, see John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 50 (Hackett 
1980) (C.B. Macpherson, ed) (originally published 1689). 
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melancholy truth that more people—think Nazi Germany,23 
Stalinist Russia,24 Pol Pot’s Cambodia,25 and so on—are killed by 
governments than by roving bands of bandits. 
Yet these unfortunate historical events do not justify giving 
up the effort to form a viable state. To be sure, anarchy has its 
dogged defenders,26 and the Hayekian principle of “spontaneous 
order” has gained more intellectual traction in political theory 
and commercial relations than it deserves.27 Perhaps some small 
communities engage in self-organization that tends to prove sta-
ble over time. But these claims are sharply bounded by two con-
siderations. First, community arrangements invariably take 
hold within a larger state: the gold miners who developed a sys-
tem of property rights were backstopped by state power in most 
of their relations with other individuals.28 Second, informal 
norms have to be backed by force against interlopers and outsid-
ers who challenge those basic norms. Hence this fundamental 
dilemma. Develop no controlling power and private violence 
flourishes, which will usually impede human cooperation, even if 
it does not snuff it out altogether.29 
Yet the alternative is worse. If good people in society choose, 
by hypothesis, to do nothing to quell violence, their passivity will 
 
 23 See R.J. Rummel, Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder 11 (Transaction 1992). 
 24 See Palash Ghosh, How Many People Did Joseph Stalin Kill? (International 
Business Times, Mar 5, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GE6P-X9YT (citing historians 
on this issue).  
 25 See Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia 
under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79 48 (Yale 2d ed 2002). 
 26 See, for example, Peter T. Leeson, Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance 
Works Better Than You Think 1–4 (Cambridge 2014); Michael Huemer, The Problem of 
Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey 334–38 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
 27 For one late expression of the ideal of “spontaneous order,” see F.A. Hayek, Play, 
the School of Rules, in W.W. Bartley III, ed, 1 The Collected Works of Friedrich August 
Hayek: The Fatal Conceit; The Errors of Socialism 154, 154 (Routledge 1988) (“A game is 
indeed a clear instance of a process wherein obedience to common rules by elements pur-
suing different and even conflicting purposes results in overall order.”). For an applica-
tion of this ideal to international politics, see Edwin van de Haar, Hayekian Spontaneous 
Order and the International Balance of Power, 16 Indep Rev 101, 105–09 (2011). 
 28 See John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial 
Distribution of Property Rights, 19 Econ Inquiry 38, 41 (1981) (suggesting that economic 
theory necessarily assumes away anarchy because it assumes that each individual has 
the legal right to some resource).  
 29 For exhaustive documentation of the endemic violence internally among the gold 
rush miners, Maine lobster fishermen, and cattle ranchers, see Stephen Clowney, Rule of 
Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U Ill L Rev 59, 69–81 
(critiquing economists’ assumption that informal private ordering avoids anarchy and 
private violence). 
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clear the way for competing militias to occupy center stage, 
catching many innocent people in the cross fire. In the resulting 
confusion, one frightening possibility is that one aggressive 
group, perhaps held together by family or religious ties, could 
become strong enough to become a state by wresting away terri-
torial control from everyone else.30 That state would embody the 
Hobbesian nightmare, because it would owe nothing to most of 
the people who lived under its rule.31 In practice, the no-state op-
tion is in fact a delusion. The only real question is who runs the 
state: relatively virtuous members of the polity, or rogues and 
despots. But it is precisely because most human beings are not 
Hobbesian monsters that all people are not necessarily con-
demned to live under tyranny and deprivation. There are more 
people who hate violence than those who want to practice it.32 It 
is they who must organize. In a democracy, median voters more 
or less call the tune, so long as they remain in control.33 But the 
tendency for disruption is always present. W.B. Yeats said it all 
too well: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of 
passionate intensity.”34 Think of the United States versus Iran.35 
Unfortunately, social contract theory does not offer any unique 
prescriptions on either of the two major challenges for any gov-
ernment—namely, what the government’s basic structure is and 
what basic rights (if any) this structure wishes to secure. 
This combination of persuasion, inducements, and force can 
work well. It was the model for the 1978 Camp David Accords,36 
 
 30 See Kareem Shaheen, Isis ‘Controls 50% of Syria’ after Seizing Historic City of 
Palmyra (The Guardian, May 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/J9AY-UVES. 
 31 See Tim Allen, Violence and Moral Knowledge: Observing Social Trauma in Sudan 
and Uganda, 13 Camb J Anthro 45, 47 (special issue 1988). 
 32 See David P. Barash, Is There a War Instinct? (Aeon, Sept 19, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/V7M8-4LTR (“[E]ven as warfare is new to the human experience and there-
fore liable to be culturally induced . . . behavioural systems of restraint are old, shared by 
numerous animal species, and therefore likely to be deep-seated in our nature.”). 
 33 See Michael B. Gibilisco, John N. Mordeson, and Terry D. Clark, Fuzzy Black’s 
Median Voter Theorem: Examining the Structure of Fuzzy Rules and Strict Preference, 8 
New Math & Nat Computation 195, 195–96 (2012). See also generally Duncan Black, On 
the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J Polit Econ 23 (1948). 
 34 W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming (1921), in W.B. Yeats, Later Poems 346, 346 
(Macmillan 1922). 
 35 See Evan Moore, A Deal Based on Trust, Not Verification (US News & World Re-
port, July 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/64EZ-MB9N (suggesting that the Obama 
administration’s “stunning concessions” in nuclear negotiations will instigate Iran’s defi-
ance of nonproliferation standards). 
 36 See generally A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David, 
17 ILM 1466 (1978); Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and 
Israel, 17 ILM 1470 (1978). 
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which brought peace between Israel and Egypt and ended the era 
of major Arab-Israeli wars.37 It is also critical to see what happens 
when that strategy is not followed. The 2003 invasion of Iraq 
triggered a global debate over the legality of preventive war.38 The 
ensuing occupation floundered due to the administration’s failure 
to properly execute the postinvasion plan that had actually been 
approved by President George W. Bush. The de-Baathification 
and disbanding of the Iraqi Army were symptoms of this fail-
ure.39 The 2007 surge then vanquished the insurgency and 
brought a fragile peace to that long-suffering country through a 
consistent policy that involved the heavy use of force combined 
with two persuasive devices that were intended to win the sup-
port of the local citizenry. The first was the public promise of 
long-term commitment.40 The second involved particular in-
ducements, continuously supplied, to persuade Iraq’s political 
factions to cooperate with each other.41 
Yet the policy was consciously repudiated when President 
Barack Obama took office in 2009.42 With the shift in admin-
istration, the conscious end of Pax Americana has led to endless 
suffering and extended conflicts that show no sign of abating.43 
The breakdown in Iraq is well-nigh complete: Tikrit and Mosul 
are in ISIS hands.44 Ramadi fell, only to be recaptured after it 
had been reduced to ruins.45 Baghdad remains within easy reach 
of ISIS.46 While the United States remained in Iraq, Prime Min-
ister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, pursued a program of cautious 
 
 37 See Office of the Historian, Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Pro-
cess (Department of State, Oct 31, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/X5M5-4RYB. 
 38 Compare, for example, William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natu-
ral Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 Notre Dame L Rev 
1365, 1372 (2004), with Neta C. Crawford, The Slippery Slope to Preventive War, 17 Eth-
ics & Intl Aff 30, 31 (2003). 
 39 See generally James P. Pfiffner, US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and 
Disbanding the Army, 25 Intell & Natl Sec 76 (2010). 
 40 See Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the 
Remaking of the Iraq War 268 (Yale 2013). 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Danielle Pletka, What Obama Has Wrought in Iraq (US News & World Re-
port, June 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/96KD-HC44. 
 43 For one of the many accounts of the power void, see id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Zach Noble, ‘Ramadi Has Fallen’: Islamic State Just Captured a Critical Iraqi 
City, Officials Say (The Blaze, May 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/97U6-5DMF. 
See also Kareem Shaheen, Iraq Celebrates Recapture of Ramadi but Victory Comes at a 
Cost (The Guardian, Dec 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2PBK-TQ4F. 
 46 See Kevin Carroll, How to Prevent the Fall of Baghdad (Wall St J, May 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/E5L8-BDJK.  
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accommodation with the Sunnis and worked within limits to 
maintain the operation of shared power within a broadly demo-
cratic framework.47 The task of reconciliation is far from com-
plete. There is little doubt that the United States did badly in 
the immediate aftermath of the invasion under the leadership of 
Paul Bremer, but after the 2007 surge it gained ground with 
forceful coordinated actions.48 Matters were moving in a positive 
direction when Obama took office in 2009 and it became clear that 
the long-term commitment to Iraq was beginning to erode.49 The 
situation came to a head when Obama withdrew all American 
forces at the end of 2011, ignoring the advice of commanders and 
the private pleas of senior Iraqi leaders.50 
Consider this chain of events. On December 14, 2011, 
Obama announced the departure of US troops from Iraq, with 
the promise that he would leave behind “a sovereign, stable and 
self reliant Iraq with a representative government that was 
elected by its people.”51 On December 18, 2011, the United 
States withdrew its last ground forces from Iraq.52 On December 
19, 2011, al-Maliki, who had ruled uneasily for ten years, had an 
arrest warrant issued for Iraq’s Sunni Vice President Tariq al-
Hashimi on charges of supporting terrorism.53 Why that result? 
With the middleman gone, al-Maliki’s calculations were easy. If 
there was a barely tenuous coexistence when the United States 
was present in force, there could be no deal once the United 
States left. So he struck first, because he could be toppled. 
 
 47 See Reidar Visser, Iraq’s New Government and the Question of Sunni Inclusion 
(Combating Terrorism Center, Sept 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/62N3-CT86. 
 48 See Pfiffner, 25 Intell & Natl Sec at 76–79 (cited in note 39); Mansoor, Surge at 
268 (cited in note 40). 
 49 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper, Obama Adds Troops, but Maps Exit 
Plan (NY Times, Dec 1, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/JZX8-W7Y6. But see Zeke J. 
Miller, Obama Says U.S. Will Bomb ISIS in Syria, Train Rebels (Time, Sept 10, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/HFW4-7BKP. 
 50 See Mario Loyola, My Iraqi Friend and the Obama Betrayal (Wall St J, May 29, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8TZY-Q2LZ; Filkins, What We Left Behind (cited in 
note 12). 
 51 Chris McGreal, Barack Obama Declares Iraq War a Success (The Guardian, Dec 
14, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9XX6-673G. 
 52 Joseph Logan, Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War (Reuters, Dec 18, 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/H85B-B3CF. 
 53 Jack Healy, Arrest Order for Sunni Leader in Iraq Opens New Rift (NY Times, 
Dec 19, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/B7E4-TWU6. 
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II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, the principal 
means of enforcing a sovereign state’s rights (including the right 
of self-defense) was self-help.54 The Charter eliminated that op-
tion through the virtually blanket prohibition of Article 2(4), 
without creating any credible enforcement mechanism to take 
its place—thus leaving individual states free to use force only in 
self-defense (and even then only “if an armed attack occurs”).55 
As typically construed, the Charter also allows for the use of 
force if an attack is imminent, an instructive example of notable 
agreement that a treaty cannot possibly mean what it actually 
says.56 But many mortal threats require preventive self-defense 
long before an attack is imminent. It is all too easy to remember 
cases in which democracies have failed to react quickly enough 
to looming danger; indeed, that was the principal lesson of the 
events that led to World War II.57 As Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill put it in his “Iron Curtain” speech of 1946, “There 
never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action 
than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the 
globe.”58 By contrast, America fared far better at the start of the 
Cold War by defining a strategic defensive perimeter in Europe 
and along the Pacific Rim and by developing a strategy of con-
taining the Soviet Union outside that perimeter.59 
 
 54 See W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International 
Law, 10 Yale J Intl L 279, 279 (1985). 
 55 UN Charter Art 51: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exer-
cise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Se-
curity Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 56 See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military 
Force, 26 Wash Q 89, 91–93 (Spring 2003) (contrasting “restrictionist” commentators 
who interpret Article 51 as authorizing self-defense only in instances in which an armed 
attack has actually occurred with “counter-restrictionists” who interpret Article 51 as 
permitting anticipatory self-defense). 
 57 See Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming 
of World War II 4 (Dee 1999). 
 58 Winston S. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, in Randolph S. Churchill, ed, The 
Sinews of Peace: Post-war Speeches 93, 104 (Houghton Mifflin 1949). 
 59 See Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? at 17–58 (cited in note 1). 
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The Truman Doctrine,60 the treaties of alliance with NATO 
and key Pacific Rim countries,61 and the strategy of containment62 
were the pillars of US strategy in the Cold War. The Soviet veto 
at the UN Security Council meant that the UN could not serve as 
a credible vehicle for containing Soviet ambitions, which enhanced 
the importance of NATO and the Pacific Rim alliances.63 These 
developments were virtually universally accepted throughout 
the free world and quickly became deeply institutionalized both 
within America’s domestic constitutional order and internation-
ally.64 But at key points, the grand strategy was in potential con-
flict with the law of the UN Charter.65 As a result, the United 
States and its major allies have paid lip service to the rules of 
the Charter, but their actual foreign policy has deviated widely 
from the Charter’s rules. 
In this context, consider the US actions in the Cuban quaran-
tine66 and Israel’s attacks on nuclear reactors in Iraq in 198167 and 
Syria in 2007.68 All of these actions were technically illegal under 
the Charter, but the international community widely accepted 
 
 60 See id at 21–24 (discussing the gradual development of Truman-era grand strat-
egy during the early years of the Cold War). 
 61 See, for example, Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System 
in Asia, 34 Intl Sec 158, 158–59 (2010). 
 62 See Hugh Ross, ed, The Cold War: Containment and Its Critics 2–19 (Rand 
McNally 1963). 
 63 See North Atlantic Treaty, TIAS No 1964, 34 UNTS 243 (1949). The key guaran-
tee in Article 5 of the Treaty begins: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one 
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all.” Id at 246. Article 5 then calls for collective action permissible under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter and agrees to report these matters to the Security Council, with this caveat: 
“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace 
and security.” Id. Note that if the Security Council does nothing, NATO continues to act. 
 64 See generally Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Mil-
itary Assistance Program, 1948–1951 (Department of Defense 1980). 
 65 See, for example, Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal As-
pects, 10 Eur J Intl L 1, 3–4 (1999) (noting that Article 51 of the UN Charter was subject 
to “gross” misinterpretations during the Cold War). 
 66 For background information on the Cuban quarantine, see Office of the Histori-
an, The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 (Department of State, Oct 31, 2013), archived 
at http://perma.cc/WG37-M3SY. 
 67 For further discussion of Israel’s 1981 attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor, see 
1981: Israel Bombs Baghdad Nuclear Reactor (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/XWC2 
-G674. 
 68 For additional information on Israel’s 2007 attack on a Syrian nuclear site, see 
David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say 
(NY Times, Oct 14, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/Q5N8-GAM6. 
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them either at the time or afterward.69 Some will say that custom-
ary international law, which is based on state practices and inter-
national acceptance, has enshrined the right of remote preven-
tion—that is, the prevention of attacks that are not imminent.70 
But that position is hardly universally accepted. Indeed, it is cer-
tainly rejected by a majority of scholars and diplomats.71 
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson put the matter in 
the proper light during congressional hearings in the aftermath 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis: 
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine 
is not a legal issue. The power, position and prestige of the 
United States had been challenged by another state; and law 
simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power—
power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty. I cannot 
believe that there are principles of law that say we must ac-
cept destruction of our way of life. One would be surprised if 
practical men, trained in legal history and thought, had de-
vised and brought to a state of general acceptance a principle 
condemnatory of an action so essential to the continuation of 
pre-eminent power as that taken by the United States last 
October. Such a principle would be as harmful to the devel-
opment of restraining procedures as it would be futile. No 
law can destroy the state creating the law.72 
This inescapably correct insight was contradicted as recent-
ly as July 23, 2015, when Secretary of State John Kerry told the 
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that US strikes against 
Iran’s nuclear program have no basis under international law so 
long as other parties continue to observe the Iran nuclear deal.73 
Under this agreement (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
 
 69 For international acceptance of the Cuban quarantine, see Monica Hakimi, To 
Condone or Condemn? Regional Enforcement Actions in the Absence of Security Council 
Authorization, 40 Vand J Transnatl L 643, 653–59 (2007). For a contrasting account 
showing international acceptance of Israel’s actions in 1981 and 2007, see Leonard S. 
Spector and Avner Cohen, Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Non-
proliferation Regime, 38 Arms Control Today 15, 16–18 (July/Aug 2008). 
 70 See Arend, 26 Wash Q at 90 (cited in note 56). 
 71 See, for example, Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-
emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 San Diego Intl L J 7, 10–11, 
14–15 (2003). 
 72 Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 Proceedings Am Socy Intl L 13, 14 
(1963) (emphasis added). 
 73 See Kaine Questions Secretaries Kerry, Moniz & Lew at Foreign Relations Com-
mittee Hearing on Iran Nuclear Deal (Tim Kaine, July 23, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/K78U-3F73. 
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of Action), all international economic sanctions against Iran are to 
be lifted early in exchange for minimal steps on Iran’s part, after 
which the sanctions will be virtually impossible to reinstate if—
or, more likely, when—the Iranians are in breach.74 The nuclear 
agreement has many flaws, but its most fatal one is the fact that 
it does not deal with the threat posed by Iran, which inheres not 
solely in the nuclear program but also in the ideology and the 
very nature of the regime. 
It is not possible to run a nuclear-nonproliferation regime, or 
a stable world order, on the basis of a principle of “sovereign 
equality” that deems democratic institutions no better than those 
of dictatorships or state sponsors of terrorism.75 This approach 
necessarily cedes to all nations the ability to obtain nuclear 
weapons for their own use (whether purely defensive or as an 
added deterrent to reinforce the projection of hegemonic power). 
We can see that trend right now, for if Iran is to have the nuclear 
bomb, then so too will Saudi Arabia, and so on down the line.76 
Any ability to stop nuclear proliferation depends on the strong 
American guarantee. Indeed, matters go sharply in reverse when 
the UN becomes the forum for international affairs. Its key disa-
bility is that it starts with the fantastically antidemocratic notion 
of parity among nations, with no standards for membership, in 
the vain hope of establishing a “Parliament of Man.” That sweep-
ing ambition undermines the UN’s more modest, proper role as 
an aid to diplomacy, as the UN’s second secretary general, the 
great Dag Hammarskjöld, wisely understood.77 
It remains necessary to devise a doctrine for the establish-
ment and evolution of international law, so that US policy can 
conform to rules of the road that both discipline the exercise of 
American power and enshrine the basic elements of an effective 
 
 74 See Barak Ravid, Nuclear Restrictions and Inspections in Exchange for Lifting of 
Sanctions: The Details of the Iran Deal (Haaretz, July 14, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/75SZ-PNMS. For more-recent developments indicating potential breach, see 
Jennifer Griffin and Lucas Tomlinson, Iran Tests Another Mid-range Ballistic Missile in 
Breach of UN Resolutions (Fox News, Dec 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B4GQ-YQAH. 
 75 Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for Interna-
tional Organization, 53 Yale L J 207, 207–08 (1944). 
 76 See Yaroslav Trofimov, Saudi Arabia Considers Nuclear Weapons to Offset Iran 
(Wall St J, May 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R7HL-3UUL. 
 77 See Dag Hammarskjöld, “The Element of Privacy in Peacemaking”: Address at 
Ohio University *25–26 (UN, Feb 5, 1958), archived at http://perma.cc/3ULM-3C2A 
(“There is an essential difference between the nation and the society of nations, each of 
which remains individually sovereign. The United Nations General Assembly is pat-
terned on a parliament but with power only to recommend not to legislate.”). 
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grand strategy, and so that America can have a foreign policy 
that is both effective and accepted as legitimate. The key lies in 
the domestic institutions that must devise and maintain our for-
eign policy. 
III.  FOREIGN POLICY DEPENDS ON A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
The complex internal-governance structure of the United 
States is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the level of in-
ternal deliberation that leads to a coherent solution sends a 
strong signal to the rest of the world that American policy is 
well formulated. Hence, Senate consent to the North Atlantic 
Treaty and to the Pacific Rim alliances has left little doubt about 
America’s commitment to those allies.78 Yet by the same token, 
strong divisions of opinion within the United States can sap its 
ability to function well in international arenas, which has surely 
been the case in recent years, with deep internal divisions over 
the wisdom of American foreign policy and military initiatives.79 
The challenge of democratic foreign policymaking was foreseen 
by the Framers, who sought to protect the nation’s foreign policy 
from the vagaries of public opinion while still ensuring the full 
participation of democratic decisionmaking.80 No single branch 
of government alone can devise a sustainable grand strategy. 
The solution is institutional cooperation and institutionalization 
of the policy itself. 
Achieving global peace is difficult because it is necessary to 
maneuver both domestic and foreign markets simultaneously. 
The cardinal point is that, in the field of foreign policy, the prac-
tical need for broad bipartisan support for a lasting policy over-
whelms any constitutional questions about the distribution of 
congressional and presidential authority.81 Simply put, if a na-
tion’s foreign policy has an acute separation of powers problem, 
 
 78 See, for example, George Bunn, Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise?, 70 
Colum L Rev 1, 42–47 (1970) (attributing US commitment to the development of NATO 
in part to strong support and active participation from Congress).  
 79 See Douglas Kriner, Accountability without Deliberation? Separation of Powers 
in Times of War, 95 BU L Rev 1275, 1291–95 (2015). 
 80 For a discussion on what the Framers had in mind regarding separation of pow-
ers between the legislative and executive branches over foreign affairs, see generally 
H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 
Wm & Mary L Rev 1471 (1999). 
 81 See James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Bipartisanship, Partisanship, 
and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947–1988, 52 J Polit 
1077, 1077–79 (1990). 
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the policy risks failure. An effective foreign policy must secure 
lasting domestic and international support to create and sustain 
long-term national commitments, especially under stress. For-
eign policy must be institutionalized and shielded from changes 
in administration, which in turn requires extensive congressional 
involvement. Any effective international position requires that 
the United States be able to make durable commitments to its al-
lies, which includes mounting credible threats against aggressive 
nations that want to prey on those allies. Such a strategy 
requires a strong bipartisan commitment that can withstand 
changes in political control. 
Knowing that these commitments have to be durable to be 
effective means that the United States must think long and hard 
before deciding to intervene in any arena with either the use or 
threat of force. But once that force has been committed, it is 
dangerous business to precipitously withdraw in ways that nec-
essarily create a power vacuum. A different administration may 
well have chosen to make the initial decision differently. But 
once the die is cast, any successor administration should keep 
within the broad contours of the policies of its predecessors. It is 
of course always necessary to execute midstream corrections, 
and it may be possible to modify the level or direction of the 
commitment. But there are limits, for these are the same kinds 
of gradual changes that have to be made within any single ad-
ministration. What an administration cannot do, at least suc-
cessfully, is decide to pull out and leave a void in power, which 
other players will rush to fill. There is, in a word, no easy or 
quick exit option once previous commitments have been made—
a lesson that the Obama administration did not grasp until the 
world saw the disastrous consequences of that hasty withdrawal 
now unfolding across the Middle East and spreading throughout 
Europe. Indeed, those errors have been compounded by the re-
cent Russian military intervention in Syria, where US foreign 
policy struggles to make incremental inroads against ISIS dom-
inance and President Bashar al-Assad’s intransigence.82 
The more theoretical question asks how to distribute power 
under our Constitution to achieve that long-term end. In one 
sense, the document was not drafted with this problem in mind, 
because in 1787 it was inconceivable that the United States 
 
 82 For one possible response, see Max Boot and Michael Pregent, How Obama 
Could Salvage His Hapless ISIS Strategy (Wall St J, Sept 30, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PG3R-EN3F. 
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would play a dominant role on the world stage.83 Nonetheless, 
we think that the basic distribution of rights under our Consti-
tution has hit on a permanent structure that today should work 
as well as any other. The basic plan of the Constitution is akin 
to a corporate model. Congress, as a two-member board of direc-
tors, sets general policies regarding funding and regulating the 
disposition of the armed forces.84 It has the power to declare 
war, and to define and punish offenses against the law of na-
tions.85 Although the point is easy to overlook, of the nineteen 
enumerated powers in the Constitution, some seven clauses 
grant specific powers to Congress over military and foreign af-
fairs, and one (the Necessary and Proper Clause) intersects 
profoundly with the operation of the others.86 At the same time, 
much of Article I, §§ 9 and 10 limits the power of the states to 
engage in foreign affairs—so that, in sharp contrast to the 
European Union,87 foreign activities lie exclusively in the pur-
view of the national government.88 
The second piece of the puzzle is the executive power, which 
gives the president both the right and the duty to see that the 
laws are faithfully executed.89 And therein lies the rub. There is 
no way that anyone can draft a constitution that works well 
with a weak executive in power. There is a simple reason why 
corporations spend so much time and effort on the question of 
succession of the CEO.90 From bitter experience, corporate 
boards have learned that no set of institutional or charter re-
straints on the CEO can offset his personal weaknesses in the 
 
 83 See Matthew Spalding, America’s Founders and the Principles of Foreign Policy: 
Sovereign Independence, National Interests, and the Cause of Liberty in the World (Her-
itage Foundation), archived at http://perma.cc/E6CZ-A75D (“At the time of its founding, 
the United States was a weak and fledgling nation . . . extremely vulnerable to the great 
powers that dominated the world.”). 
 84 See US Const Art I, § 8. See also Aaron Blake, Congressman: Members of Con-
gress Are Underpaid (Wash Post, Apr 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6X4R-APPS 
(quoting Representative Jim Moran as calling Congress “the board of directors for the 
largest economic entity in the world”). 
 85 See US Const Art I, § 8, cls 10–11. 
 86 US Const Art I, § 8. 
 87 See Kristin Archick, The European Union: Questions and Answers *7 (Congres-
sional Research Service, Sept 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6BJM-DC22. 
 88 See US Const Art I, §§ 9–10. 
 89 See US Const Art II, § 3. 
 90 For the importance of CEO succession, see generally Wei Shen and Albert A. 
Cannella Jr, Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO Succession: The Impacts of 
Successor Type, Postsuccession Senior Executive Turnover, and Departing CEO Tenure, 
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office or the weaknesses of the people whom he chooses to fill 
subordinate positions. It is worth noting that the decision to re-
move former Baathists from virtually all government positions in 
Iraq was apparently made not at the highest levels by either 
Congress or the president, or even by Bremer in his capacity as 
the administrator of the Iraqi Provisional Authority. We have 
heard inconsistent accounts on whether Meghan O’Sullivan, a 
deputy national-security adviser for Iraq, was for or against the 
decision.91 But that is precisely the point. Once decisions go below 
the highest level, they are opaque, and allocations of power be-
tween the president and Congress are of little operational im-
portance. Whether one approves of de-Baathification is beside 
the point. The key insight is that vital decisions are frequently 
made by second-tier officials, often without direct oversight from 
above. 
The need for effective, quick, decisive action on the ground in 
distant places is not a reason to oppose a constitutional system of 
divided authority at home. In fact, the separation of powers is crit-
ical in the foreign policy arena. It is clear that the Constitution 
makes a major effort to secure civilian control over the military 
when it makes the president the commander in chief of the Ar-
my and Navy (and even the Air Force), as well as the militia 
“when called into the actual Service of the United States.”92 
Quite consciously, in calling up the militia the president cannot 
act unilaterally but must depend on the prior action of Con-
gress—which is yet another check on the president’s power.93 
Note that textually, the president does not have any “command-
er in chief power”94 that goes side by side with his pardon pow-
er.95 Instead, this power is subject to the rules and regulations 
that Congress makes under its Article I powers.96 As Alexander 
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 69, the president in his role as 
commander in chief is “much inferior” to the English king97 and 
 
 91 See, for example, L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Fu-
ture of Hope 40–49 (Simon & Schuster 2006); Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside 
the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism 415–19, 464 (HarperCollins 2008). 
 92 US Const Art II, § 2. 
 93 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 15. 
 94 Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief, and the Militia 
Clause, 34 Hofstra L Rev 317, 325 (2005). 
 95 See id at 327–28. 
 96 See id at 320–21. 
 97 Federalist 69 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 462, 465 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed):  
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most notably does not possess the power to declare war or to act 
outside the frame of reference set by Congress.98 
Not only is Congress empowered to give its advice and con-
sent to treaties and to provide for the regulation of the armed 
forces but also—crucially—Congress is given the power to define 
“Offences against the Law of Nations.”99 There is no reason to 
think that the Framers intended this power to be limited to do-
mestic law; they quite properly saw Congress as a vital source of 
the country’s definition of international law itself.100 
The administration of President Bush made a major mis-
take when it elected to define rules for the treatment of al Qaeda 
detainees captured in the battlefield and for counterterrorism 
operations without input from Congress. The Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005101—made necessary by damaging public con-
troversy and adverse court rulings—did put to rest the separa-
tion of powers issue, but it left the procedural rights of the 
detainees too vague for comfort.102 The Bush administration 
should have sought to enshrine its policy in an act of Congress 
from the very beginning to shield the policy from damaging con-
troversy and to give the policy lasting impact. 
One of the most vexatious elements of our constitutional 
scheme is the operation of the treaty power. The constitutional 
text is simple enough. Under Article II, § 2, the president “shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”103 That provision removes the House of Representatives 
from the process and makes it appear that the president does 
 
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King 
of Great-Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing 
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, 
as first General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British King 
extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and 
armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the 
Legislature.  
It is worth noting that Hamilton also said that “the President is to be Commander in 
Chief,” which is textually accurate and constitutionally instructive. Id. 
 98 See Epstein, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 324–25 (cited in note 94). 
 99 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10. 
 100 See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and 
Punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations”, 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 447, 465–74 (2000). 
 101 Pub L No 109-148, 119 Stat 2739, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000dd 
et seq. 
 102 See Arsalan M. Suleman, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 19 Harv Hum Rts J 
257, 260–65 (2006). 
 103 US Const Art II, § 2. 
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not have unilateral power to enter into any treaty. By modern 
sensibilities about political theory, the exclusion of only the 
House, and not the Senate, seems archaic.104 In 1787, the indi-
rect election of the Senate by the state legislatures may have 
created the image that its sober judgment as the upper house 
was most needed for international affairs. But now, with the di-
rect election of the Senate,105 the sociological pedigree of the two 
houses is much closer. 
The Iran nuclear deal raises serious concerns about the 
president’s ability to improperly skirt the Senate’s ratification 
role in the treaty process.106 In the Iran negotiation, the presi-
dent claimed that the resulting pact was an executive agree-
ment, which did not constitute a treaty and hence could be en-
tered into unilaterally by the president.107 Opponents argue that 
no transaction this momentous should be done unilaterally by 
the president, and they note by way of example that, unlike the 
Iran nuclear deal, the Iraq War had the support of both Con-
gress and the American people when it was launched.108 The dis-
pute has generated furious disagreement, but where does it 
leave us? 
Against the common historical use of executive agree-
ments,109 there is no reason as a matter of constitutional practice 
why the Iran nuclear deal needed to be presented to the Senate 
as a treaty because, as far the public documents reveal, it does 
not require any changes in domestic law.110 The president had all 
the waiver authority he needed under current sanctions to con-
clude the deal as an executive agreement, and with respect to 
the UN sanctions, there is no way for Congress to constrain the 
 
 104 See Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or 
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 Yale L J 
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 106 See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Program (Council on 
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 109 See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Execu-
tive Agreements, 86 Cal L Rev 671, 722–61 (1998). 
 110 See John Yoo, Why Obama’s Executive Action on Iran Does Not Violate the Law 
(National Review, July 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B6SM-LP5F (“Obama-
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president’s vote in the Security Council. On the other hand, by 
not presenting the agreement as a treaty, the president has en-
sured that it will not be enshrined as a lasting policy. The fact 
that the Iran nuclear deal is not binding for purposes of domestic 
law is therefore a double-edged sword. Therein lies the failure of 
not negotiating with Iran an agreement that could be ratified by 
a two-thirds vote of the Senate. In the most charitable view, it is a 
huge missed opportunity, because foreign policy is most success-
ful when it is instituted on a bipartisan basis.111 The reverse of 
that coin is that imposing any agreement of this importance on an 
unwilling people without the support of Congress is both doomed 
to fail and destined to prove damaging to vital US interests. 
Compare the ratification of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Wa-
ter112 (“Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”) with the negotiations 
for the Iran nuclear deal. The former, a treaty with the Soviet 
Union and Great Britain, was signed on August 5, 1963, and 
thereafter ratified in the Senate on September 23, 1963, by a 
vote of 80–19 before President John F. Kennedy signed the trea-
ty, as ratified on October 7, 1963.113 The Limited Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty has now lasted over fifty years.114 The Iran negotia-
tions have not followed that straightforward path. The Iran nu-
clear deal, with its multiple exit options, trap doors, and time 
triggers for all parties, is unlikely to prove as enduring, especial-
ly given the lack of buy-in from Congress. Unfortunately, the 
fact that it is not legally binding does not detract from its char-
acter as a fait accompli. It is far from clear how a future presi-
dent’s decision to abrogate or modify the current agreement 
would affect either actions that have already been taken under 
it or our relations with other nations. The Iran nuclear deal ap-
pears to have been negotiated in such a way as to maximize the 
 
 111 For a general discussion of the effect of the Iran nuclear deal, see Bryan R. Gibson, 
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benefit to Iran and the harm to the United States that would 
flow from a congressional disapproval.115 
With respect to the president’s inherent power to use force as 
commander in chief, the War Powers Resolution,116 adopted over 
the veto of President Richard Nixon, demonstrates the difficulty 
of setting out a unified program. The War Powers Resolution 
sets out a series of timetables: The president must notify Con-
gress within forty-eight hours after initiating the commitment of 
US military forces to battle.117 There is an ostensible sixty-day 
period in which force may be maintained, followed by a thirty-
day withdrawal period.118 Presidents have generally complied 
with the Resolution’s provisions, even while affirming its uncon-
stitutionality.119 It is likely that President Bill Clinton skirted 
these provisions in initiating his bombing campaign in Kosovo in 
1999.120 President Obama, reversing earlier practice, insisted on 
the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution121 and then 
explicitly ignored its requirements when he committed American 
airpower in Libya—a disastrous intervention that once again 
shows the dangers of half measures that are undertaken abroad 
without a strong domestic consensus behind the strategy.122 The 
unfortunate impasse over the War Powers Resolution is that its 
uncertain constitutional and political statuses exacerbate rather 
than salve the separation of powers problems of American for-
eign policy. 
The dangers from the Nixon era have carried over recently, 
as the United States continues to dither in response to the 
threat that ISIS poses in the Middle East. The weakness of the 
American response shows as a simple matter of international re-
lations the massive risk of a policy that allows for the use of air 
 
 115 For a discussion of the concessions made by the United States during the negoti-
ation stage, see James Phillips, No Deal Still Better Than a Bad Deal on Iran Nukes 
(The Daily Signal, June 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6ZDK-AWN8. 
 116 Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified as amended at 50 USC § 1541 et seq. 
 117 50 USC § 1543(a). 
 118 50 USC § 1544(b). 
 119 See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 Va 
L Rev 101, 104 (1984). 
 120 See Andrew D. LeMar, War Powers: What Are They Good For?: Congressional 
Disapproval of the President’s Military Actions and the Merits of a Congressional Suit 
against the President, 78 Ind L J 1045, 1052–53 (2003). 
 121 See Conor Friedersdorf, 3 Ways Obama Expanded War Powers Well beyond 
George W. Bush (Defense One, Nov 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P4HX-E7WC. 
 122 See Charlie Savage and Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role 
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forces, but not ground forces, in combat. The airpower is signifi-
cant enough to have political implications, but it is not able to 
decisively reshape the strategic reality on the ground. Airpower 
alone can be effective in a coercive diplomacy mode, as Clinton 
demonstrated when the 1999 Kosovo action ended in the Dayton 
Peace Accords.123 But the Obama administration is obviously not 
trying to bring ISIS to the negotiating table and, in any case, the 
administration does not appear to believe in coercive diplomacy 
to start with, as demonstrated by its supine acceptance of virtu-
ally all of Iran’s opening negotiation positions in the Iran nucle-
ar deal.124 
Obama’s half measures show the failure to apprehend the 
dangers of weak military leadership and confused grand strate-
gy. Of course, he has plenty of support. For example, Professor 
Harold Koh, Obama’s former State Department legal adviser, 
has written in support of a resolution that would both 
(1) “authorize the president to use such force against ISIL . . . as 
is necessary and appropriate to achieve agreed-upon, defined 
strategic objectives” for at most two years, geographically lim-
ited to Iraq and Syria and operationally limited to no US ground 
forces; and (2) narrow or repeal the 2001 al Qaeda and 2002 Iraq 
Authorizations for Use of Military Force125 before leaving office if 
the al Qaeda conflict recedes.126 Koh supported this view by vir-
tue of the fact that it will place the US military intervention on 
firmer legal ground while simultaneously allowing the United 
States to take the nation off its war footing.127 And indeed, the 
president did not seek explicit authorization to root out ISIS 
from the Middle East.128 Unfortunately, this approach to the use 
of force is dead wrong. Most likely, the practical effect and in-
tended purpose of the Resolution were not to authorize force but 
to deauthorize it and bequeath the deauthorization to the next 
president. That proposal is designed not to put possible military 
 
 123 For the successes and problems of the coercive use of air force in the Kosovo ac-
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action against ISIS on firmer footing but rather to complicate 
the legal issue for future presidents. 
There is no reason to precommit a future president to a ver-
sion of future events that may never occur. No one can say for 
sure whether the war in Iraq or Syria will spread to Libya, 
Yemen, or Pakistan, or even to other places as yet unknown. 
There was no reason to think when the resolution was first pro-
posed that this conflict could be wrapped up within eighteen 
months. Instead, a resolution to that effect signals weaknesses 
to our enemies and reduces one serious element of uncertainty 
in the way in which they wish to formulate their plans. Nor did 
it make sense, then or now, to bar the use of ground forces. At a 
minimum, these forces can improve the accuracy of the air war. 
More than that, they can stiffen through good leadership the 
Iraqi elements that are involved in the struggle by putting back 
on the table a set of inducements that might be able to foster co-
operation among the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. When the pres-
ident takes to the air, he tells the American people “what the 
United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and 
ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL.”129 
“Ultimately” can take a long time, assuming that the nation 
does not tire of a half venture that has produced few visible re-
sults. Nor is “ultimately” ever likely to occur, so long as the ad-
ministration does not grasp the essentials of the rotten-kid theo-
rem and instead insists that additional US action depends on 
Iraqi formation of an inclusive government, which remains a 
perilous operation.130 The Iraqi government is, of course, in dis-
array.131 For each day that the United States occupies a margin-
al role, it becomes harder to correct for past errors. It is com-
monplace to attack American policy in Iraq as a trillion-dollar 
blunder, and in an odd sense it has turned out that way.132 But 
the explanation lies not in that we intervened too much but ra-
ther in that, after the military successes of 2003, we did too little 
to execute the tripartite strategy of persuasion, inducements, 
and force, which was belatedly put into place only during the 
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surge. The losses that followed were more attributable to a weak 
intervention than to a strong one. 
CONCLUSION 
So as the issue now stands, what can be done? Whether the 
issue deals with either Iraq or Iran, we do not think that there is 
any institutional fix that can handle the question so long as the 
president—and, to some extent, Congress—is committed to a 
policy that downplays the critical leadership role of American 
foreign policies, even in the face of the increasing instability in 
the Middle East and elsewhere. But in the large scheme of 
things, we think that two points do become clear. 
First, the difficulties that we face as a nation are not in large 
measure attributable to our constitutional structure, which sets 
an appropriate framework for dealing with matters of war and 
peace. The system of separation of powers can produce better de-
liberations and focused action that can then legitimate American 
leadership in the rest of the world. Note that, in making this 
claim, we use the word “appropriate” and not some stronger term 
like “effective” or “definitive”—owing to the complexity of the sit-
uation, this stronger objective is simply unattainable when set 
out in general terms. James Madison famously said in Federalist 
10 that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm,” 
so the Constitution must be drafted in a way to cope with the 
dangers that factionalism poses to the nation.133 But it is critical 
to note the problems to which that remark was addressed: debtor 
relief, restrictions on foreign manufacturers, and the apportion-
ment of taxes—all of which are matters on which some structural 
constraints are workable.134 Think of Article I, § 8, which limits 
the power to tax to matters that concern the debt, the common 
defense, or the general welfare of the United States,135 and un-
derstand that the last clause is not an open invitation to tax for 
whatever purpose Congress may desire.136 Think also of Article I, 
§ 10, which states that no state shall make any law “impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts.”137 
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Second, interpretive fixes of this sort are regrettably una-
vailable for foreign policy matters when the sound exercise of 
both congressional and presidential power is critical above and 
beyond the constitutional text. We see no way in which the 
United States’ foreign policy endeavors can be successful—even 
if we have an ideal constitutional structure—unless we also 
have leaders in both branches of government, as well as many 
members of the public at large, who understand the basic com-
mitments necessary to allow the United States to succeed. Our 
power in large measure is the response to the soundness of our 
permanent government structures. In a hostile and ugly world, 
moral relativism that dwells on America’s past sins will not set 
the right tone for public debate. It will not do for President 
Obama to invoke the sins of Christian crusaders when asked 
about the ISIS atrocities.138 Unless we still believe in American 
exceptionalism and Pax Americana, we cannot make the kinds 
of durable commitments that will allow decent people to put 
their trust in us and others to fear the consequences of our 
wrath. 
To be sure, statements of this sort bespeak (especially in 
light of the dismal performance of recent years) a certain level of 
arrogance. But what is the alternative? The wholesale slaughter 
of innocent people caught in the cross fire between roving bands 
of, or subject to the thumbs of, ugly tyrants. No, we cannot be 
the universal policemen for the world, but neither can we abdi-
cate our responsibilities because, frankly, there is no one else 
out there who can take our place. 
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